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Abstract 
Incumbent leaders may manipulate fiscal policy in terms of increasing rectment 
or capital expenditure to convince voters of their competence in running the 
government. Financing of the increased expenditure is what leads to fiscal 
balances since the expenditure exceeds the revenue a country generates. Tllis 
study aims to find out whether fiscal policy is affected by election years for the 
East African Community member countries which include Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. The main variables of interest are pre-election, 
election, post-election years and the fiscal balance to capture the fiscal policy 
manipulation. Control variables are also included such as inflation, the logarithm 
of the exchange rate and the growth rate in real GDP. Arellano and Bond 
Generalized Method of Moments estimator was applied to the dynamic panel data 
model for the time span 1990-2015. The study concludes that the fiscal balance is 
not affected by the incumbent leaders. This is so because the fiscal balance was 
insignificant during the election years for the EAC member countries. However, 
there is a significant relationship between fiscal balance and the growth rate in real 
GDP indicating that the fiscal balance in East African member countries is 
affected more by economic variables as compared to opportunistic incumbents. 
Despite the fact that fiscal balance is not affected by elections, there is still need 
for strong institutions which translate to better governance, better allocation of 
public goods, which leads to sustained growth that will lead to a reduction in the 
fiscal balance. 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
1.1 Background Information 
During election years, government spending tends to rise as taxes lower. This is done by 
incumbent officials trying to convince voters of their competence in running the 
government. Since voters respond to economic conditions that are good, an incumbent 
will use expansi()nary fiscal policy which will affect economic outcomes and stimulate 
economic growth. Anthony Downs (1957, p.28), said that patiies "formulate policies in 
order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to fonnulate policies". These 
cycles characterized by political manipulation of fiscal variables is what leads to the 
existence of political budget cycles. 
18111 February 2016 was an election year for Uganda. 48% of the Ugandan total budget 
allocation went to infrastructure (Budget Highlights Uganda, 2016). In Rwanda, elections 
were carried out on August 2017 and overall expenditure rose to 1.95 trillion francs in the 
year 2016/2017, from 1.81 trillion francs in the year ending 2015/2016 (Reuters, 2016). 
An increase in the budget leads to increased fiscal balances. Fiscal balances occur when 
the revenue a country generates is less than its expenditure. This fiscal balances due to 
expenditure oriented policies by incumbents are what lead to the political budget cycles. 
A fiscal policy is a tool used by governments to influence taxes and spending. 
Expansionary fiscal policies allow tax cuts, increased transfer payments, rebates and 
increased gove1nment expenditure. The main instrument used to expand fiscal policy is 
an increase in public expenditure as opposed to lowering tax in developing economies 
(Schuknecht, 2000). This is so because the tax base is small in developing countries and 
would therefore not enhance government popularity as it is hardly visible. Also the effect 
of reduced taxes on economic perfotmance will not be immediate making it difficult for 
the gove1nment to reap its political benefits. Fiscal balance which is the difference 
between govetnment revenue and expenditure is used in this study as a proxy for fiscal 
policy 
Figure 2 analyses government expenditure as a percentage of GDP from 1997-2015 for 
the East African countries. From the graph below, the government expenditure has been 
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gradually rising for Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania across time. However, for 
Burundi in the year 2010 which was an election year saw the government expenditure rise 
to its highest The rise in government expenditure could lead to economic growth if the 
expenditure is directed to productive sectors. However if used opportunistically by 
incumbents, is detrimental to the economy as it is not sustainable. Kenya' s growth in 
government expenditure from the year 2010/2011 to 2015 can be attributed to the fact that 
Kenya devolved its goverm11ent leading to more expenditure being cham1eled towards 
county goverm11ents. Tanzania' s highest peak in govenm1ent spending was in 2010 which 
was an election year in Tanzania. Rwanda reached its highest in 2014 but reduced its 
goverm11ent expei1diture in 2015. This was attributed to the fact that the period 2014/2015 
which is not an election year was affected by delayed donor disbursements and lower 
domestic revenue flows as well as slow implementation of projects. As a result of these 
developments, total spending was lower than projected (Ministry of Finance, 2015). 
In Uganda, the 2011 elections were marred with exceptional spending offighterjets. This 
led to a retrospective approval of supplementary budgets to a tune of 3 3% of the approved 
budget. 2006, another election year in Uganda, saw the 2005/2006 supplementary budget 
increase of nearly 10% of the approved budget and the supplementary budgets being 
largely recurrent in nature (The East African, 2011). The increased lavish expenditure by 
incumbents could also lead to increased inflation in addition to increased fiscal balances. 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
The reason government expenditure is encouraged is that it leads to economic growth if 
channeled to productive sectors of the economy. However are these expenditure-oriented 
policies used by oppmiunistic incumbents to secure their re-election prospects? This 
study addresses the issue as to whether elections have an impact on government 
expenditure in the East African Community (EAC) member countries. Shi and Svensson 
(2006) find out that the existence of Political Budget Cycles (PBC) is more evident in 
developing as opposed to developed countries. Where on average, government fiscal 
balance increases by almost 1% of GDP in developing economies during election years as 
opposed to developed. A study done in one ofthe EAC member countries by Weinstein 
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(2011) argues that the Tanzanian ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi, in a bid to win 
elections, increased capital expenditure hence increased fiscal balances in the most 
supp01iive districts. 
This paper seeks to study whether fiscal policy is affected by elections for the EAC 
member countries. As developing economies, they are better placed to explain the PBC 
because of the weak institutional capacity and poor transparency in budgets that increases 
their vulnerability of experiencing election induced fiscal policies. An understanding of 
the degree of fiscal policy volatility during election periods in these countries and whether 
the rise in government expenditure during election years is sustainable and growth 
enhancing is important so as to find the most appropriate fiscal consolidation measure to 
take. Fiscal consolidation refers to the policies taken up by governments to reduce fiscal 
balances. 
Furthermore, with the Political Federation, where EAC member countries aim to fonn a 
central government as the ultimate goal of the EAC Region, it is important to understand 
how the government spending behaves in the individual countries during election years. 
This will enable the EAC members to strengthen fiscal rules and institutions to avoid such 
manipulation. 
1.2.1 Research Objective 
The overall objective of tllis research is to find out whether fiscal policy is affected by 
election years for the East African Community member countries. 
1.2.2 Research Question 
Is fiscal policy affected by election years in the EAC member countries? 
1.3 Justification of the study 
This study aims to add to the pool of studies on the existence of PBC in developing 
countries by identifying how various macroeconomic factors are affected by elections. 
This is impo1iant because government expenditure is meant to be growth enhancing and 
several studies have been carried out to find out the impact of government expenditure on 
growth. However, if govermnent expenditure is raised by opp01iunistic incumbents, this 
may not lead to growth but rather spike inflation which is detrimental to the economy. 
This will benefit EAC member counties as it will enable policy makers in individual 
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countries identify if political budget cycles really exist and if so, find ways to ensure that 
a rise in government expenditure is sustainable and growth enhancing rather than 
opportunistic. 
1.4 Scope of study 
This study will cover the EAC member counties which include Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, 
Burundi and Rwanda. The period of study is 36years from 1980-2016. It covers the time 
around which the EAC countries had their first presidential elections. Presidential 
elections in these countries take place every 5 years for most of the countries. However, 
South Sudan is omitted from this study since there is insufficient information regarding 
fiscal policy and no election has been carried out yet. An election is anticipated in the year 
2018. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Political Budget Cycle research exammes the effect election cycles have on public 
expenditure, taxes and budget balances. Theoretical literature provides theories that are in 
support of political budget cycles that have evolved over time. Earlier scholars such as 
Nordhaus (1975) argue that incumbents had to ensure they maximise their reelection 
prospects by increasing their vote share. Tllis was done by expansionary policies to 
stimulate the economy. Other scholars using the moral hazard model argue that 
incumbents will be elected if voters are able to assess their competence in the delivery of 
easily observed public goods which will lead to increased balances prior to an election 
(Persson & Tabellini, 1990). Sill and Svensson (2006) on the other hand came up with an 
adverse selection model that emphasizes the role of temporary information asymmetries 
between the incumbent and the voters. 
The section on theoretical literature therefore expounds on the vanous factors that 
influence the existence of these cycles such as information asymmetries, transparency and 
the level of democracy which enable incumbents manipulate variables such as 
expansionary monetary policy and fiscal policies. 
This chapter also looks at empirical work that either supports or contradicts the existence 
of political budget cycles amongst different countries and time spans. Various scholars 
employ different macroeconomic variables both monetary and fiscal to explain these 
cycles. 
2.2 Theoretical Literature 
Theory on political cycles dates back to the 1970s which captured the fact that economic 
decisions were made within a political framework. Nordhaus (1975) argued that the 
Philips curve which tries to explain that inflation and unemployment are inversely related, 
explains the concept of oppmiunistic political business cycles. Governments in these 
models would expand monetary policy which leads to inflation prior to elections and this 
would lead to lower unemployment. Lower unemployment in turn was a sign of good 
economic conditions which led voters to re-elect the incumbent. Expansionary monetary 
policies were studied by earlier scholars. However with time focus was shifted to election 
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induced fiscal cycles where information asymmetry, transparency, composition of 
spending, fiscal conservatism and new democracies play a key role in determining the 
existence if any and degree of these cycles. 
Expansionary Monetary Policies 
With time, scholars relaxed the assumption that inflation was used by incumbent leaders 
to attract voters by reducing unemployment prior to elections. This is because voters tend 
to be rational and anticipate such decisions. Alesina (1998) argues that governments 
cmmot reduce unemployment before the election since voters will anticipate the rate of 
inflation to rise after the election. Voters are more forward looking and this will affect 
their prefeiTed choice of leader. Consequently, incumbents choose an expansionary 
monetary policy only if it can signal to the electorate that their economic decisions m·e 
competent (Persson & Tabellini, 1990). However, monetm·y business cycles are not as 
relevant because of the emergence of the independence of the Central Banks hence few 
governments have the freedom to influence monetary policy directly. Researchers have 
therefore shifted their focus from expansionary monetary policy to exmnining electoral 
cycles in expenditure policies. 
Information asymmetry 
Sibert and Rogoff (1988) disagree with fact that rational voters would allow their 
expectations to be influenced by pre-election antics. Rather, these cycles are influenced 
by temporary information asytmnetries where the incumbents have more information than 
the voters. Therefore the voters may not see the need to monitor the government closely 
enough to know if taxes are effectively used by the government. Voters might not find it 
wmihwhile to engage in costly information gathering to determine who to vote for. Hence 
before elections, voters could be easily manipulated by incumbents as they try to signal of 
their competence. This infmmation asymmetry gives rise to these electoral cycles in 
macroeconomic policy. 
More recent Political Budget Cycles models contrast with Rogoff and Silbert (1988) in 
the fact that there exist temporary information asymmetries between the voters and the 
incumbents which explain the electoral cycles in fiscal policy. Shi and Svensson (2006) 
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in their moral hazard model of political competition argue that despite the fact that most 
voters are informed, they will behave opportunistically since some of the voters remain 
uninfo1med. If a greater number of voters that fail to distinguish between incumbent 
competencies from fiscal policy manipulation that is election induced is more, the 
incumbent benefits from increasing expenditure prior to elections. 
The politico-institutional environment plays an impo1iant role 111 what incentivizes 
incumbents to create these cycles. More specifically, the more benefits gained by 
politicians when still in power, the more their incentives are to influence the perception 
voters have about them before an election (Shi & Svensson, 2006). 
Peltzman, (1992) disagrees with the fact that fiscal policy is manipulated by opportunistic 
incumbents to increase their vote share. He argues that govemors in the US are punished 
if they increasing spending. He also argues that incumbents who increase expenditure 
prior to elections are not able to fool voters since they end up being punished even more 
increasing expenditure by the time their term ends. This is because voters have 
information concerning fiscal data and are therefore well infmmed as they cast their 
ballots. 
Eslava (2005) in a study in Colombia of local governments argues that well informed 
voters are not easily bought by an increase in expenditure as the voters do not like 
increased expenditure and fiscal balances. Political manipulation therefore does not take 
the form of increased government spending but rather is as a result of changes in the 
composition of government expenditure. This change in political manipulation is because 
voters despite being rational, still lack enough infmmation to determine whether the 
choices made by incumbents are due to opportunistic manipulation. 
Transparency 
Lassen (2006) supports this argument that the existence of political budget cycles should 
not exist in countries that have fiscal institutions that are transparent. Instead, incumbents 
on the state level use different fiscal strategies in an attempt to increase the suppmi of 
voters. Examples of altemative strategies include increased social transfers prior to the 
election. 
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Adi (2003) and Drazen (2008) report similar findings. Adi (2003) argues that in Israel, 
voters are in a position to effectively monitor fiscal choices made by politicians, large 
balances before an election tend to reduce an incwnbent's re-election chance. Brender 
(2008) finds out that the vote share an incumbent receives decreases with an increase in 
fiscal balances prior to the elections. It therefore means that voters who are well informed 
are averse to increased government balances. 
Fiscal conservatism 
Fiscal conservatism provides yet another explanation for election-induced government 
expenditure which involves the reduction in government spending to avoid fiscal balances 
by targeting some specific groups at the expense of others. Drazen (20 1 0) finds out that 
electoral manipulation still does exist but it is not evident in aggregate expenditure. 
Fiscal policy instrument 
Rogoff (1990) includes the composition of government spending in the signaling model 
but it yields a different prediction. Voters are easily enticed by taxes and current 
expenditure as compared to capital expenditure. This infmmation is used by voters to 
make decisions on whether the incumbent is competent. The competent incumbent is 
therefore at a position to increase cuiTent expenditure that is easily observable and reduce 
capital expenditures which is less visible. 
Schuknecht (2000) focuses on the fiscal policy instrument used by developing countries 
to offer a chance for re-election. The author finds out an expansion of fiscal policy is the 
main instrument used to increase public expenditure as opposed to lowering tax. This is 
so because the tax base in developing countries is small and incwnbents would not 
therefore use it as it would not enhance popularity as it is hardly visible. Also, a tax cut 
would not have an immediate effect on economic perfonnance making it hard to actually 
reap the political benefits. 
Some recent studies based on regional data are in support of this, i.e., they find no evidence 
of election cycles on govenunent spending but identify a change in the spending 
composition that is easily targeted because of its visibility such as road construction and 
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physical structures (Drazen & Eslava, 201 0). Porche (2007) finds a positive and 
significant effect of upcoming elections on support for the agricultural sector. 
New Democracies 
Brender (2007), in a cross-section of countries, finds evidence in suppmt of PBC, and 
argues that theses cycles are driven by countries that became democratic recently hence 
the name "newer democracies". Once the newer democracies are omitted from the sample, 
the political budget cycles disappear. This is so because politicians are inexperienced with 
electoral policies hence voters lack information that is necessary to properly evaluate 
fiscal manipulation. 
Allan (2007) argues that it is important for governments in new democracies to deliver 
good economic policies. Political budget cycles are therefore a characteristic of counties 
that are democratically fragile. Svensson (2006) is an extension ofRogoffs (1990) model 
which analyses the effects democracy and the institutional quality have on the size of the 
fiscal cycles. Transparency is emphasized in both models as it reduces the size of the 
political budget cycle. 
2.3 Empirical Revie\·V 
Empirical literature on Political Budget Cycles examines various models used to explain 
these cycles. Research has been canied out in developed and developing economies, new 
and existing democracies and results differ depending on the data sets and model 
specifications. This section begins with empirical studies that prove that PBC lead to a 
shift in the composition of government expenditure rather than increased fiscal balances. 
This section also provides evidence of PBC in developed, developing and new 
democracies. 
Composition of spending 
Several empirical studies that have been can·ied out to actually find out that governments 
would rather change govenm1ent expenditure composition towards more visible cunent 
expenditure as opposed to capital expenditure. Schuknecht (2000) using 24 developing 
countries from 1973 to 1992 attempts to find out the choice of policy instruments used by 
incumbents. Regressions are run on the panel data for the 24 countries using the fixed 
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effects model. The fiscal variable is the dependent variable while the other independent 
variables include the election variable, the countries terms of trade changes, trade 
orientedness of a country, the real effective exchange rate, regime of the exchange rate 
and programs supported by IMF. The study found out that public expenditure increased 
prior to elections since it enhanced an incumbent's popularity as it had a direct impact on 
the welfare of voters. Vergne (2009), also in support of a change in the composition of 
expenditure using a dataset of 42 developing countries from the period 1975 to 200 I 
repmis that the composition of spending shifts towards cutTent expenditures that is more 
visible in particular towards subsidies and wages during elections. The variables used in 
this study include transport and communication expenditure as a proxy for capital 
expenditure spending and an election dummy to reflect the impact of elections. The 
method used is the generalized method of moments for dynamic panel data models. 
Developing countries 
Manipulation of fiscal policy prior to elections was initially thought to be a phenomena of 
developing economies. This is due to the presence of weak institutions in developing 
countries. Ames (1990) in a panel data study of 17 Latin American countries for the period 
194 7-1982 calTied out multiple regressions on political and economic factors that affect 
the changes in government expenditure. The researcher finds out that there is a 6.3% 
increase in govenunent expenditure prior to the elections and it decreased by 7.6% in the 
post-election year. 
Schuknecht (1996), on the other hand carries out a study of these cycles in 35 less-
developed countries from 1970 to 1925. The researcher argues that Less Developed 
Countries (LDC) are prone to more manipulation by the incumbents. This is so because 
checks and balances are weaker and incw11bents have more power over monetary and 
fiscal policy. Expenditure oriented policies such as employment generation tlu·ough public 
work programs or the distribution of free or subsidized goods are thus more effective than 
tax reductions to affect voter behavior. 
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Developed countries 
Persson and Tabellini (1990) argue that developed economies are strongly affected by 
Political Budget Cycles. The authors ' divides the sample to countries that are democratic 
hence are characterized by elections that are competitive. The countries are 40 and span 
from the period 1960-1998. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) is used to estimate the effect 
of the structure of the political party on the type of economic variable manipulation by 
prior to elections. The authors finds a political revenue cycle where the revenues decrease 
as a share of GDP prior elections in a single party government as compared to a coalition 
govemment. No political cycle is found in expenditures, transfers or overall budget 
balance across the countries or political systems. This was obtained using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) by regressing government spending and type of government on per-capita 
income, population over 65, openness, federalism, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, and 
UK colony. 
Developing and developed countries 
Some scholars argue that these political cycles are a phenomena of developing economies 
while others argue that they are present in developed countries as well. Shi and Svensson 
(2006) carTied out a study incorporating both developed and developing countries to find 
out the extent to which both developed and developing countries are affected by these 
cycles. In a panel of 85 developed and developing countries, over the period 1975-1995, 
using a dynamic panel data specification and the GMM. Shi and Svensson (2006) find that 
on average, fiscal balances as a percentage of GDP increase by almost 1% in the year 
elections are calTied out. This is in supp01i of political budget theory in developing 
countries. Political budget cycles are larger in developing countries as compared to 
developed countries. 
Klomp and Haan (2013) m a more recent study examme the differences between 
developing and developed countries. Data is employed on 70 countries that are democratic 
for the period 1970-2007. Existence of PBC was tested using the Pooled Mean Group 
(PMG) estimator in their sample since Instrumental Variable (IV) or Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) presume that the data is suitable to be pooled. However, in panel 
models with large N and T the assumption of homogeneity of the slope coefficients is 
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frequently rejected. Klomp and Haan (2013) find out that elections have a significant 
effect in the shmi run on the budget balance and government spending. On average, there 
is a 0.6% increase in government spending and 0.8% decrease in budget balance during 
elections. The authors also find out that the occtmence of PBC is affected by the level of 
development such that the short-run effect is much stronger in developing than industrial 
countries. In the long run for industrial countries, there is a small but negative effect on 
govenunent spending but a positive one on the budget balance. The implication of this is 
that although there is expansionary fiscal policy prior to elections, governments take 
restrictive measures to control the fiscal imbalances maybe because of the dislike voters 
have towards budget balances (Peltzman, 1992). 
Level of Democracy 
Democratized countries are countries that experience competitive elections to vote their 
leaders. Incumbents have to therefore convince voters to vote for them. Most developing 
countries are characterized as new democracies while developed countries as established 
democracies as they have practiced democracy longer. 
Recent studies report evidence on the existence of Political Budget Cycles in democracies 
that are already established. Grier (2008) in canying out a study for the US from 1961-
2004, finds out that election timing plays a significant role in the quarierly GDP growth. 
The variables in this study are multiple lags of changes in interest rates, money growth, 
inflation, energy prices, lagged output growth, government spending and timing of 
elections. 
Tujula (2007), in support for Political Budget Cycles in their sample of Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries for the period 1975-2002. 
Finds out that elections, debt growth, macroeconomic developments and political factors 
have a significant effect on the budget balance. 
Similarly, Mink (2006), finds evidence of opportunistic behavior of policymakers in the 
majority of the European Union (EU) countries after the start ofthe monetary union. The 
author uses a multivariate model for the time span 1999-2004. Mink (2006) finds out that 
all countries apart from Pmiugal had a decreased budget balance during election years as 
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compared to the prior election year. On average, there is an increase in the budget balance 
by 0.96% of GDP with an election dummy used in the model. The empirical model used 
accounts for the output gap as a proxy for the business cycle and the difference between 
the actual and expected real GDP growth to capture unforeseen economic developments 
that may affect fiscal policy outcomes. Mink (2006) also takes to account the potential 
election effects, hence two alternative indicators are considered. The first involves adding 
a dununy to the equation that indicates whether a year is an election year or not. The 
second one is a similar dummy used to account for pre-election years. The pre-election 
dummy was included since election induced fiscal measures take time to have an effect 
hence there is a probability the fiscal measure was taken prior to the actual election. 
Block (2002) finds evidence ofPBC in countries that are newly democratized. The sample 
included 69 developing countries. The author catTies out this test implementing both fiscal 
and monetary policy variables as dependent variables to test for the existence of these 
cycles. These variables include fiscal balances, expenditures, government consumption, 
and net claims on government while the monetary variables include money growth, 
interest rates, inflation, seignorage, and exchange rates. The results suggest that politicians 
primarily interested in ensuring they get re-elected manipulate both fiscal and monetary 
policy instruments to win the support of rational voters. During election years, the fiscal 
balance, public spending, government consumption and net claims increase as share of 
GDP while there are faster monetary expansions and lower nominal interest rates. In 
patiicular there is a 1-2.6 percentage increase of GDP during election years. 
For the democratic cotmtries that have previously been studied, it is evident that there 
indeed exists manipulation on economic indicators by governments to improve their 
chances of election. 
2.4 Conceptual Framework 
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the dependent and independent variables for this 
study. For political budget cycles to exist, the fiscal balance should rise in election years. 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the fiscal balance which is the difference 
between total revenue and total expenditure. The independent variables are the lagged 
levels of the fiscal balance, tlu·ee election dummy variables to indicate the pre-election, 
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election and post-election year, the real GDP growth rate, inflation rate and the logarithm 
of the exchange rate. 
Political budget cycle literature, suggested indicators of fiscal policy to include fiscal 
balances, taxes and goverrunent expenditure. This sh1dy employs the use of fiscal balance 
as it is a reflection of the effects of both revenue and expenditure. The lagged level of the 
fiscal balance is present because the fiscal balances in the current year are affected by the 
balance in the prior year. 
The election dummy takes the value one during an election, post-election and pre-election 
year and 0 otherwise. Pre -election year is introduced since politicians may manipulate 
government expenditure the year before so as to ensure they are re-elected while already 
elected officials may begin expansionary policies right after they are elected. 
The exchange rate is included because it indicates a countries competitiveness. A 
depreciation in the exchange rate makes a country more competitive as a country earns 
more revenue due to increased exports. Inflation is included as it affects the cost of goods 
sold hence increased expenditme by politicians will raise the inflation rates. While the 
GDP growth rate is used since a faster growth rate leads to a reduction in the budget 
balance as a result of higher taxes which lead to increased revenues (Brender & Drazen, 
2008). 
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Figure 3: Conceptual Framework Representation 
Independent Variables 
Lagged logarithm ofFiscal 
,- Balance 
Variable 
f- Pre-election Year dummy 
I Dependent Variable I !- Election year dummy 
Logarithm 
~ 
of Fiscal Post Election year dummy 
Balance 'II 
- GDP growth rate 
f- Logarithm of Exchange Rate 
'---- Inflation rate 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
This chapter contains the methodology used and data sources that explain the existence of 
political budget cycles. A dynamic panel data specification was used and the GMM 
estimator employed. The reason for this particular model selection is expounded more in 
this chapter. 
3 .1 Research Design 
The study can be classified as longitudinal in nature. The choice was justified because the 
study seeks to follow the same sample which are the EAC member countries over time 
and make repeated observations on fiscal policy in the election years. Longitudinal 
research design will seek to describe patterns of change in government spending in 
election years and help establish the direction and magnitude ofthe causal relationships. 
3.2Population and sampling 
The population in this study is all the EAC member countries that include Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan. The sample is the EAC member countries 
except South Sudan because of inadequate infmmation concerning the country. Election 
data is unavailable as they have never had a presidential election hence it cannot be relied 
upon to explain the political budget cycles. 
3.3 Data Collection and source of data 
The study is based on 5 EAC member counties. The period of study is 25 years from 
(1990-20 15). This is so because data for all variables is readily available from 1990. Data 
on election years is obtained from The Database on Political Institutions from the World 
Bank. Supplementary data on election years was obtained from the African elections 
website. Data on the fiscal balance (difference between revenue and total expenditure) as 
a percentage of GDP is obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Missing data points in some of the countries were 
obtained from the East African community data po1ial. Data on the real GDP growth rate, 
exchange rate and inflation is obtained from the World Bank's World Economic 
Indicators' database. 
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3.4 Data Analysis 
3 .4.1 Model Specification and variable description 
The model is a standard dynamic panel data model since the lagged value of the dependent 
variable Logfiscit appears as an explanatory variable. This is because fiscal variables 
tend to be highly cyclical. 
logfiscit = {31 logFiscit-l + {32 logFiscit-z + f33 Growthit+f34 Ele( -1)it+f35 Eleit 
+ {36 Ele( +1)it+f37 lnfit + {38 LogExchit + eit +flit 
The regression includes: 
Logfiscit : The fiscal balance for country i at time t 
logFiscit-l logFiscit-z: Two lagged levels ofthe logaritlun ofthe fiscal balance 
Growthit : The growth rate of real GDP in country i at time t 
Infit: The inflation rate of country i at timet. 
LogExchit: Logarithm ofthe exchange rate of country i at timet. 
Eleit: An election indicator for country i at timet at the election year 
E le ( -1): Pre-election indicator 
E le ( + 1): Post -election indicator 
eit: The eiTor term for country i at timet. 
flit: Country specific effects 
{35 : Beta coefficients are the unknown parameters that need to be estimated. 
The real GDP growth rate, inflation rate and logarithm of exchange rate were used as 
control variables. Control variables are used in an attempt to increase the robustness of 
main the findings. 
The election variables Eleit ' Ele(-1) and £le(+1)were treated as dummy variables 
during the election, pre-election and post-election years respectively. With the value I 
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during the election, pre-election and post-election year and 0 otherwise. The election 
variables used were treated as exogenous variables. The reason for this is that no good 
election instrumental variables exist. Also, this is the standard approach used in PBC 
literature hence it makes results comparable. 
However, some econometric problems exist from estimating the equation above. The 
lagged dependent variable and the unobserved heterogeneity captured by flit makes 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator biased. Fixed Estimator cannot be used since 
taking first differences removes the unobserved heterogeneity but the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable retains the endogeneity problem. The Fixed Effects bias is dependent 
on the length of the time series. The estimator is consistent only if the length goes to 
infinity (Nickell, 1981) (Kiviet, 1995). With the average number of observations for each 
country in the sample as 26, the bias of the fixed effects estimator may still be present. 
3.4.2 Generalized Method ofMoments 
The Arellano and Bond generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator is used to 
counter some of the problems. It instruments the differenced variables that are strictly 
exogenous with all their available lags in levels. 
Since the lagged dependent variable Logfiscit is present in the model, it is correlated 
with the error term causing endogeneity. This is because the lagged error of the logarithm 
of fiscal balance is not contemporaneously conelated with the error term Ei,t· The error 
te1m of the cunent period is therefore conelated with the error tenn of the previous period. 
But since the lagged period's error is a direct determinant of the lagged fiscal balance, this 
creates correlation between the lagged fiscal balance and the current period' s enor. 
Arellano and Bond propose the difference GMM estimator for dynamic panel models. The 
first difference for the equation can therefore be written as follows : 
(Logfiscit- Logfisci.t_1 ) = {31 (Logfisci.t- 1 - Logfisci,t-z) 
+ {33 ( Growthi,t - Growthi,t_ 1 ) + {34 (lnfi.t - lnfi,t- 1 ) + 
{35 (Ele(-1)i,t- Ele(-1)i,t_ 1 ) + {36 (Elei.t- Elei.t_ 1 ) + {37 (Ele(+1)i,t-
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Ele( +1)u-1) + f36(logExchu- logExchi,t_1) + (Eu- Ei,c-1) For i = 1, ... N, t = 
1, .. T 
For consistent parameter estimates of the dependent variable, additional instruments 
needed to be included. The valid instruments for the independent variables are lagged 
values of the dependent variable. However, for the lagged dependent variable Logfiscit' 
its instruments are lagged values of the dependent variable and can either be 
Logfiscu,Logfiscu_1 or Logfiscu-z· This solves the problem of endogenous 
variables. 
The two lags of the logaritlun of the fiscal balance are used as GMM-style instruments 
since they are the endogenous variables. The instruments of the endogenous variables 
need to be kept few especially since the number of countries in the sample are few. A 
large number of instruments will lead to the sargan test being weak. The Sargan test is a 
test of over-identifying restrictions where the null is that the instruments are not conelated 
with the error term. This is done in order to provide some evidence of the instruments' 
validity to be a 'good instrument' which is meant to make the instruments relevant 
(correlated with the endogenous variables). The exogenous variables are instrumented 
against themselves. They include the pre-election, election and post-election year 
dummies, the real GDP growth rate, the logaritlun of the exchange rate and the inflation 
rate. 
3 .4.3 Autocorrelation Test 
A test for autocorrelation was also carried out. Autocon·elation refers to when an error 
term in one period affects the other. Presence of autocorrelation in a regression may make 
the coefficients appear to be statistically significant when they are not. The null hypothesis 
in this test is that there is no autoconelation and is applied to differenced residuals. The 
test for AR (1) process in first differences usually rejects the null hypothesis but the test 
for AR (2) is accepted to prove that there is no first-order serial correlation in the residuals 
of equation in levels. 
The lagged levels are however poor instruments which leads to less efficient estimates for 
first differences if the variables are similar to a random walk. The system GMM by 
20 
Arellano and Bover is proposed in which if the original equation in levels is added to the 
system leading to additional instruments it increases efficiency. In this equation, variables 
in levels are instrumented with suitable lags of their own first differences. These first 
differences should be unconelated with the unobserved country effects hence the need to 
use extra moment conditions that rely on initial observations. 
However, difference GMM was used for this analysis because system GMM requires the 
use of more instruments. Therefore, it may not be appropriate to use system GMM with a 
dataset with a small number of cotmtries. Because when the number of instruments is 
greater than the number of countries the Sargan test may be weak. 
3.5 Estimation Procedme 
Univariate explanatory data analysis was first carried out to understand the data through 
its descriptive statistics. 
The Akaike Info1mation Criteria (AI C) was used to find the appropriate number of lags 
of the dependent variable. 
The Arellano and Bond generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator was then used 
with the GMM-style instruments as the two lagged levels of the logarithm of fiscal balance 
which is the dependent variable. The control variables: real GDP growth rate, inflation 
rate and the logarithm of exchange rate and the election variables were instrumented 
against themselves in the difference equation. 
The Sargan test and the test for autocorrelation are can·ied out on the GMM model. First, 
there is test for the validity of the assumption that the error term eit is not serially 
con·elated. Serial correlation refers to when an error term in one period affects the other. 
Presence of serial conelation in a regression may make the coefficients appear to be 
statistically significant when they are not. The null hypothesis in this test is that there is 
no autoconelation and is applied to differenced residuals . The test for AR (1) process in 
first differences usually rejects the null hypothesis but the test for AR (2) is accepted to 
prove that there is no first-order serial conelation in the residuals of equation in levels. 
The second test was the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. The null is hypothesis 
is that the instruments are not conelated with the enor tetm. This was done in order to 
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provide some evidence of the instruments' validity to be a ' good instrument' which rs 
meant to make the instrument relevant (correlated with the endogenous variables). 
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Chapter 4: Etnpirical Results and Analysis 
The findings from this research are presented in this chapter. Descriptive statistics were 
first canied out to better understand the data, then the Arellano Bond GMM estimator was 
used to test for evidence of Political Budget Cycles. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Analysis was conducted on univariate exploratory data. This gave a general overview of 
the data. The table below shows the descriptive statistics. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Log Fiscal Balance 65.50 37.67 1 130 0 1.80 
Inflation rate 11.46 10.02 -2 56 1.94 7.19 
Growth rate 3.08 13 .83 -68.3 36.2 -1 .50 8.43 
Log Exchange 6.13 1.22 3.13 7.94 -0.59 2.18 
Pre-election dummy 0.16 0.37 0 1 1.84 4.38 
Election Dummy 0.16 0.37 0 1 1.84 4.38 
Post-election Dummy 0.15 0.35 0 2.00 4.01 
The total number of observations is 130. The election indicators took a value of 1 during 
the election year, pre-election year and post-election year and 0 otherwise. From the table 
above the inflation rate was is at 11.46% on average with the minimum at -2% while the 
highest is at 56%. This shows some instability in the inflation rate. The real growth rate is 
at 3% of GDP. Which means that on average, the 5 countries will grow at a rate of 3%. 
Logarithm is taken for the exchange rate to conveti the USD to logarithm. The fiscal 
balance was also converted to logarithm to set the variable to a cetiain range and avoid 
extreme values. 
The panel dataset is strongly balanced as there are no missing data points. The real GDP 
growth rate and the logarithm of the exchange rate are negatively skewed while the 
election dummies and the inflation rate are positively skewed. A kuriosis of greater than 
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3 implies non-normality of the data. The logaritlun of fiscal balance and the logarithm of 
exchange rate are the only variables that are n01mally distributed. While the inflation rate 
and real GDP growth rate experience kmiosis that is in excess of 3. This may have an 
effect on statistical inference. However taking the taking of differences eliminates non-
nonnality. 
4.2 F indings 
The Arellano and Bond GMM estimator is applied using two lagged levels of the 
dependent variable as GMM style instruments and all the control variables and election 
dummies were instrumented against themselves. 
The choice of two lags is justified by the use of information criteria as shown in table 2. 
Table 2: Information criteria 
Lag Df p AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 10.07 10.07 10.09 
1 1 0.000 9.54 9.56 9.58* 
2 1 0.071 9.53 * 9.55 * 9.59 
Akaike information criteria is applied in this case despite the fact that it allows the use of 
many lags as compared to SBIC. This is because the maximum number oflags that affects 
fiscal balance need to be identified. 
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Table 3: Arellano Bond panel-data estimation 
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From the table above, it is evident that none of the election variables are significant at 
either the 1%, 5% or 10% level of significance. The coefficients of the election dummies 
although insignificant, agree with literature to support the existence of fiscal manipulation 
during election years. The positive coefficient indicates that there is an increase in the size 
of the balance in the pre, post and during an election year. This validates the existence of 
Political Budget Cycles. 
The growth rate and the two lagged levels of the logarithm of the fiscal balance are 
significant. However, there is a negative coefficient to indicate that there is a negative 
relationship between the fiscal balance and the GDP growth rate. It therefore means that 
a 1 percentage point increase in the real GDP growth rate results to a 62% decrease in the 
fiscal balance. The lagged levels of the logarithm of fiscal balance are significant to 
indicate that the fiscal balance in the current year is affected by the fiscal balance of the 
previous two years. 
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The logarithm of exchange rate is insignificant though it implies that an increase in the 
exchange rate leads to an increase in the fiscal balance. The inflation rate is also 
insignificant but implies that an increase in the inflation rate leads to an increase in the 
fiscal balance. 
The R2 is 0.5274 implying that the independent variables explain 53% of the variation of 
the logaritlun ofthe fiscal balance. The f-test of the overall significance is less than 0.05. 
The null hypothesis indicates that all the variables are not jointly significant in influencing 
the dependent variable. The null hypothesis is therefore rejected indicating that all the 
independent variables which include two lagged levels of the fiscal balance, the election 
indicators, exchange rate, inflation rate and the real GDP growth rate are significant in 
influencing fiscal balance. 
The sargan test is a test on the validity of instrumental variables. The null hypothesis being 
tested is that the instrumental variables are exogenous making them acceptable. Based on 
the results of the sargan test, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments as a 
group are exogenous. This is because the p-value is greater than the level of significance. 
Therefore, we can therefore conclude that the instruments used are well chosen. 
Table 4: Sargan Test 
Sargan test of overidentifying res t rictions 
HO : over ident i fying restr i ct i ons are valid 
chi 2( 107) 
Pr ob > chi 2 
11 9 . 5361 
0.1 919 
The Arellano Bond is a test for autoconelation. The null hypothesis is that no 
autoconelation exists for the differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is rejected for the 
first order since the p-value is less than the 5% significance level. This is so because of 
the presence of the lagged dependent term. However, for the second order serial 
con·elation for the first difference residuals, the p-value is greater than the level of 
significance. This indicates that there is first order serial conelation but there does not 
exist second order serial conelation in levels. Hence there is no evidence of 
misspecification. 
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Table 5: Test for autocorrelation 
Are l lano- Bond test for zero autocorre l ation in first - differenced errors 
Order z Prob > z 
1 - 7 . 3124 0 . 0000 
2 - .55721 0 . 5774 
HO: no autocorrelation 
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Chapter 5: Discussions and Conclusion 
This chapter links the objective of this study to the results presented in chapter 4. The 
results are discussed and conclusions based on the results are contained in the sections 
below. 
5.1 Discussion 
The main objective of this study was to determine whether fiscal policy is affected by 
elections in the EAC member countries. The objective was achieved tlu-ough carrying out 
the Arellano Bond GMM estimation on the data. The variables used included the 
logarithm of fiscal balance and its lagged values, the election indicator for the pre-election 
year, election year and post-election year and some control variables such as the real GDP 
growth rate, inflation rate and the logarithm of the exchange rate. To prove the existence 
of political budget cycles, the election indicators are meant to be significant. 
Studies have noted that existence of these political budget cycles is indeed a phenomena 
of developing countries due to their weak institutions (Block, 2002). However, results in 
this study indicate that there does not exist any manipulation prior post and during election 
years as indicated by the lack of significance at 1%, 5% and 1 0% levels of the fiscal 
balance. Similar to Seitz (2000), there is evidence of no fiscal manipulation but rather the 
fiscal balance is affected by economic factors in particular real GDP growth. Seitz (2000) 
in his study of 10 German states from 1970-1996 finds no evidence of expenditure or 
fiscal manipulation and concludes that the fiscal variables are affected by economic 
factors . Despite the fact that the fiscal balance is insignificant during the election years, 
there is a positive coefficient which is in line with political budget cycle literature (Shi & 
Svensson, 2006). 
From the results, a 1 percentage point change in the real GDP growth rate would lead to a 
62% decrease in the fiscal balance. Gupta, Clements, Baldacci, and Mulas-Granados 
(2005) in their study argue that the fact that fiscal policy and growth are inversely related 
holds for countries that have not yet achieved stable macroeconomic conditions. This is 
because countries that have more stable macroeconomic conditions do not experience 
increased growth with a decrease in fiscal balances. 
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The lagged variables of the fiscal balance are also significant with a positive coefficient 
implying the current fiscal balance is caused by the balance from the previous two years. 
This therefore means that the fiscal balance variable is highly persistent. 
The exchange rate is insignificant though the positive coefficient implies that there is a 
positive relationship between exchange rate and fiscal balance. This may be the case since 
government expenditure on infrastructure is heavily reliant on impmis. Therefore a change 
in the exchange rate makes imports more expensive hence increasing expenditure which 
leads to increased balances. The inflation rate is also insignificant with a positive 
coefficient which indicates that there exists a positive relationship between inflation and 
fiscal balance. This is in line with what is expected because an increase in inflation leads 
to increased expenditure which in turn increases the fiscal balance. 
5.2 Conclusion 
The study set out to find out whether fiscal policy is affected by elections amongst the 
East African countries. This is because incumbents may be oppmiunistic and manipulate 
fiscal policy by increasing fiscal balances to finance their expenditure which leads to the 
existence of political budget cycles 
The existence of these cycles is seen as a phenomena of developing countries because of 
their weak institutions (Block, 2002). However, the results of this study disagree with 
political budget theory literature. Fiscal balances are insignificant in election years. 
However, the relationship between fiscal balance and elections is in suppmi of political 
budget cycle literature because of the positive coefficient that indicates that in election 
years, the deficit increases. 
Fiscal balance is however influenced by the growth rate. A 1 percentage point increase in 
the growth rate leads to a 62% decrease in the fiscal balance. The fiscal balance in East 
African countries is therefore influenced by economic factors such as the real GDP growth 
rate. Therefore policies directed to increase real GDP growth amongst the East African 
member countries will help reduce the fiscal balance. 
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5.3 Recommendations 
Knowledge on the existence ofPBC is important for policy makers in the achievement of 
fiscal consolidation. Fiscal consolidation refers to policies the government undertakes to 
reduce debt. Despite the fact that fiscal balance is not driven by opportunistic incumbents, 
there is still need to strengthen political institutions since this leads to better governance, 
better allocation of public goods which leads to growth. Growth has a direct effect on the 
reduction of balances. 
5.4 Area of further research 
Scholars such as Mackie (2013) use different fiscal variables such as expenditure, taxes, 
current and capital expenditure in Croatia to find out that fiscal balance and total 
expenditure increase in the election, pre-election and post-election years. Inclusion of 
other fiscal variables apati from fiscal balance which incorporates both revenues and 
expenditures could possibly yield different results. 
It would also be interesting to assess the impact of fiscal policy at the county level 
especially with the onset of devolution for a country like Kenya. This would assess 
whether decisions made by voters are influenced by opportunistic incmnbents. 
5.5 Limitations of the study 
One major setback for this study is the availability of data for EAC member counties hence 
leading to a short time series which leads to fewer data points. The results may therefore 
be more robust with a longer time series. 
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Appendix 
Election years for the EAC countries from 1990-2015 
Country Election Years 
Kenya 1992,1997, 2002, 2007, 2012 
Uganda 1996, 2001 , 2006, 2011 
Tanzania 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 
Rwanda 2003, 2010 
Burundi 1994,1998, 2005, 2010,2015 
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